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Introduction
This article analyzes the viability of the National Hockey League Players Association’s
recklessness and negligence claims against the National Hockey League for its liability relating to
traumatic brain injuries.1 In doing so, Part I of this article explores the overtly physical and violentladen culture that is deeply-rooted within the sport of professional ice hockey. Additionally, Part
I will examine the general nature of the allegations contained within the National Hockey League
Concussion Litigation. Following this brief overview, Part II of this article outlines the American
legal perspectives relating to tortious liability for injuries sustained as a result of player to player
conduct. To illustrate the potential application of such tort law principles with regards to
professional ice hockey-related claims, this section will analyze various case law, as well as the
events that occurred on January 27, 2016, in which NHL Linesman, Don Henderson, was
forcefully struck in his neck/head by Calgary Flames defenseman, Dennis Wideman.2 Thereafter,
Part III discusses the implications of the legal standards depicted in Part II in an attempt to
determine the general viability of the Players claims against the League.3 Additionally, this section

1

See Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, Leeman, v. National Hockey League, Civil Case No. 13CV-1856 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C., Nov. 25, 2013), see e.g., Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint, In Re: National Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 14-2551 (SRN/JSM)
(D. Minn.) (On November 25, 2013, the first of five proposed class action cases were filed by over two dozen former
National Hockey League players against the National Hockey League [hereinafter “NHL” or “League”]. On August
19, 2014, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered that all similar cases by former players against the
NHL were to be centralized and transferred to the District of Minnesota under the assignment of the Honorable Susan
Richard Nelson); see also In Re: National Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 14-2551
(SRN/JSM) (D. Minn.) available at: http://www.nhlconcussionlitigation.com/information.html (the National Hockey
League Players Association [hereinafter “NHLPA” or “Players”] generally allege that the NHL, as evidenced by the
League’s promotion and glorification of unreasonable and unnecessary violence, acted negligently by failing to warn
and adequately protect players from the adverse effects of repeated concussions and head trauma) [hereinafter “NHL
Concussion Litigation”].
2
See generally Josh Cooper, NHL Linesman Don Henderson Had Neck Surgery From Dennis Wideman Hit: Report,
July 31, 2016 available at http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nhl-linesman-don-henderson-had-neck-surgery-fromdennis-wideman-hit-report-192054868.html.
3
The scope of section is specifically limited to the Players’ tort-related negligence claims against the League.
Accordingly, issues concerning labor law and the validity of scientific data relating to Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy (hereinafter “CTE”) and concussions will not be analyzed for purposes of this article.
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explores the violent nature of professional ice hockey and how excessive violence within the sport
of hockey poses unique challenges for claimants relating to causation and the doctrine of
assumption of risk.
I. From the Ice to the Courts – A Glance into the Violent Culture of Ice Hockey
Professional ice hockey is arguably the most dangerous and violent sport ever created.4
While other professional contact sports are fixated on physical and often violent interactions
between competitors, professional ice hockey is nevertheless more dangerous for three main
reasons. First, the intrinsic elements of the game make professional ice hockey inherently more
dangerous and violent than any other professional contact sport. Specifically, ice hockey is the
only sport in which players compete on an enclosed ice surface, surrounded by steel-stiffened
boards, all while attempting to body-check opponents at speeds upwards of twenty miles-perhour.5 Moreover, ice hockey is the only sport in which participants are armed with light-weight
composite sticks, plastic-reinforced padding and a helmet that often provides minimal to no facial
protection. Given the physical nature of the game, its enclosed surface, ultra-fast pace, and
minimal yet tactical equipment, the propensity for on-ice violence has become more prevalent than
ever.6

4

See generally Jeff Yates and William Gillespie, The Problem of Sports Violence and the Criminal Prosecution
Solution, 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 145, 150-60 (2002) (hereinafter “Yates & Gillespie”).
5
Reed Albergotti, Setting a Speed Trap in Vancouver, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 2010, available at:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704479404575087542656588862 discussing the average speed of
an Olympic hockey player.
6
See Nicola Joyce, Too Many Men on the Ice?: Why Criminal Prosecutors Should Refrain From Policing On-Ice
Violence in the NHL, The Harvard John M. Olin Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, No. 9 (2007) (hereinafter
“Joyce”). Suggesting the violent nature of professional ice hockey is in part due to the official NHL rules that permit
forceful body-checking and fighting.
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Second, unlike other professional athletes, ice hockey players are widely renowned for
their extreme toughness and otherworldly pain threshold.7

As one commentator noted,

“professional athletes are tough, but no athlete in the world is tougher than the professional ice
hockey player […] and hockey players prove that on a daily basis.8 In fact, researchers recently
concluded that from 2009 to 2012, more than 63 percent of the 1,307 NHL players missed at least
one regular season game due to an injury sustained during the course of play. 9 Additionally, such
studies have also found a correlation between an increase in the total number of injuries per-season,
specifically concussions, as the average players’ height and weight increased over the past few
decades.10 Notwithstanding these alarming results, professional hockey players have become
notorious for playing through the pain and continuing to compete, despite suffering gruesome
facial lacerations, broken bones, dislodged teeth, and even concussions.11

See generally Rich Clune, The Battle, The Players’ Tribune, July 1, 2015 available at:
http://www.theplayerstribune.com/rich-clune-hockey-nhl/. Having formerly played at the professional level, Clune
notes that hockey players “are programmed to never, ever admit to pain.” (hereinafter “Clune”)
8
Paul McCoun, The 10 Greatest Examples of Hockey-Tough, Jan. 12, 2010, available at:
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/324477-the-10-greatest-examples-of-hockey-tough. Detailing numerous incidents
in which players remained in the game or returned to play despite being severely injured during the course of the
game. For example, during Game six of the 2003 Stanley Cup finals, Anaheim Mighty Ducks forward, Paul Kariya,
was knocked unconscious by New Jersey Devils defenseman, Scott Stevens. Despite suffering a concussion, Kariya
missed only 11 minutes of play before scoring a crucial goal to force game seven; Joe McDonald, Gregory
Campbell Breaks Leg, Jun. 7, 2013 available at: http://www.espn.com/boston/nhl/story/_/id/9347725/2013-nhlplayoffs-gregory-campbell-boston-bruins-breaks-leg-done-postseason. Discussing an incident in which Boston
Bruins Forward, Gregory Campbell sacrificed his body to block a slap shot. Despite shattering his right fibula,
Campbell remained on the ice (skating) for over a minute and even recorded another blocked shot before exiting the
game.
9
The Hockey News, Injuries Cost NHL $218 Million A Year in Lost Salaries, A Wallop to Bottom Line, Study, The
Canadian Press, Jan. 20, 2014 available at: http://www.thehockeynews.com/news/article/injuries-cost-nhl-218m-ayear-in-lost-salaries-a-wallop-to-bottom-line-study.
10
See generally Richard A. Wennberg and Charles H. Tator, Concussion Incidence and Time Lost from Play in the
NHL During the Past Ten Years, 35 Ca. J. of Neurol. Sci. 647 (2008).
11
See e.g., Brandon Prust, Why We Fight, The Players’ Tribune, Feb. 3, 2015 available at:
http://www.theplayerstribune.com/why-we-fight/. Former Teammate Brandon Prust recalls New York Rangers
forward, Derek Stepan, remained in the game despite suffering a broken jaw (hereinafter “Prust”); Joe Smith, Tampa
Bay Lightning’s Steven Stamkos Plays Through Bloody Nose After Being Hit in Face by Puck, Tampa Bay Times,
May 27, 2011 available at: http://www.tampabay.com/sports/hockey/lightning/tampa-bay-lightnings-stevenstamkos-plays-through-bloody-nose-after-being/1172312. Tampa Bay Lightning Forward, Steven Stamkos, was
7
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Third and most notably, professional ice hockey is the only sport where fighting is openly
recognized as a component of the sport but the outcome of the fight has no direct bearing on which
team will be victorious.12 Thus, by virtue of allowing players to fight, the National Hockey League
“remains the only major league in which violence is, if not quite institutionalized, nevertheless
actively encouraged.”13 Although technically a violation of the official rules in which those
involved in an altercation serve a mere five-minute penalty,14 fighting is often demanded and even
praised by fans and players alike.15 Yet aside from the fan-excitement generated when two players
square-up in an attempt to beat one another to a bloody pulp, many critics have scrutinized the
National Hockey League for refusing to acknowledge the dangers associated with fighting and
allowing fighting to remain a part of today’s modern game.16
Nonetheless, many proponents for fighting contend that fighting is a natural consequence
that arises in part because physicality and violence are inescapable elements of the game.17
Moreover, as the National Hockey League expanded and became more popular over time, it
became apparent that not all fights were initiated as a result of such inescapable elements. Rather
on-ice violence—in the form of fighting—was seen as a unique mechanism of self-policing, as

dubbed a “warrior” when he opted to return to the game despite suffering a broken nose and multiple stiches from a
slap shot to the face.
12
See e.g., Joyce, supra note 6; The Associated Press, Bettman Says Safety in Hockey Is Issue, Not Fighting, The
New York Times, Mar. 27, 2007 available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/sports/hockey/27nhl.html.
13
See J.C.H Jones and Kenneth G. Stewart, Hit Somebody: Hockey Violence, Economics, the Law and the Twist and
McSorley decisions, 12 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 165, at 167 (2002).
14
National Hockey League Official Rules 2015-2016, Rule 46, Fighting, available at:
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/rules/2015-2016-Interactive-rulebook.pdf (2015).
15
See Joyce, supra note 6 at 1.
16
See Carter Anne McGowan, The Other Skate Drops: The NHL Concussion Lawsuit, 25 NYSBA Entertainment,
Arts and Sport L. J., at 26 (2014). Discussing the correlation between the violent nature of hockey, specifically
fighting, in relation to an increase in the number of concussions suffered per-season.
17
Joyce, supra note 6 at 1-4; see e.g., Barbara Svoranos, Fighting? It’s all in a Day’s Work on the Ice: Determining
the Appropriate Standard of a Hockey Player’s Liability to Another Player, 7 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 487, 490 (1997)
[hereinafter “Svoranos”]; Gregory Schiller, Are Athletes Above the Law? From a Two-Minute Minor to a TwentyYear Sentence: Regina v. Marty McSorley, 10 Sports Law J. 241, 264-65 (2003).
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well as a primary tactic used to intimidate, punish, and deter opponents from taking cheap-shots
at the more talented and skillful players on one’s team.18 As fighting developed as a method for
instilling fear and justice upon opponents, many teams began employing larger, more aggressive
players known as “enforcers.”19 Generally, the enforcers were valued for their physicality and
willingness to fight, rather than finesse or skill.20 Comparable to on-ice body-guards, the enforcers
presence alone gave teammates a sense of security while on the ice. 21 Ordinarily, enforcers
generally received minimal ice-time. But despite spending most of the game on the bench,
enforcers were often times ordered onto the ice to instigate a momentum-changing fight or to
“deliver preemptive or retributive hits for questionable actions of opposing players.”22
Despite the oxymoronic rationale of preventing violence via practicing violence, many
current and former players have noted that fighting is needed in order to keep the game safe.23 For
example, if an opposing player were to take advantage of a smaller, better-skilled, or vulnerable
player, the enforcer on the victim’s team will often intervene by initiating a fight or responding
with a retributive hit of his own. Thus, the enforcer’s role is to physically inform the opposing
team that their player’s actions will not be tolerated, regardless of whether he acted within the
confines of the rules. Consequently, the enforcer’s deterrent effect will often times force the

See Stu Hackel, The Morning Skate: HBO Makes ‘Broad Street Bullies’ a Love Story, The New York Times
(2010), available at: http://slapshot.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/the-morning-skate-hbo-makes-broad-streetbullies-a-love-story/(Characterized as a “tooth-less army of larger-than-life players including, Dave ‘The Hammer’
Schultz, Bobby Clarke, and Bernie Parent,” the 1970’s Philadelphia Flyers (known as “The Broad Street Bullies”)
employed an extremely aggressive style of play, “often punching first and not bothering with any questions later.”)
(hereinafter “Hackel”)
19
See Matthew P. Barry, Richard L. Fox & Clark Jones, Judicial Opinion on the Criminality of Sports violence in
the United States, 15 Seton Hall. J. Sports & Ent. L. 1, 7, 6-15 (2005) (discussing the role of the enforcer)
[hereinafter “Barry, Fox & Jones”]; see e.g., Yates & Gillespie, supra note 4 at 150 (stating “enforcers are kept on
teams primarily for the fighting ability and to intimidate opponents.”) [hereinafter “Yates”].
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
See Prust, supra note 11.
18
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opposition reconsider his course of action, given the fact he may have to answer to the other team’s
enforcer.
At the same time, however, the role of the enforcer has become more than just a fan-shared
fetish or strategy for winning games and protecting teammates.24 Instead, it has become a means
to an end for less-talented, and otherwise marginally-skilled players to achieve their childhood
dreams of playing in the National Hockey League.25 Although most enforcers would prefer to
have achieved their dream of playing in the NHL on merit of their hockey skills, many are willing,
but few are successful in opening the inimitable side entrance into the NHL as an enforcer. 26 But
one’s willingness to forge a path to the NHL with his fists and accept this inherently dangerous
role is not ideal, especially considering the detrimental effects and health risks associated with
fighting.27
As exemplified by the National Football League’s recent concussion settlement, concerns
regarding player-safety and excessive violence within the world of professional sports have
become a highly contested and litigated issue.28 In light of the tragic deaths of former NHL
24

See Hackel, supra note 18. Discussing how the acceleration of fighting in the NHL brought positive nationwide
attention to the sport, as well as grave concerns about the overly violent nature of the game and player safety that
“have yet to evaporate.”
25
See Clune, supra note 7.
26
See e.g., John Branch, Derek Boogaard: Brain ‘Going Bad’, N.Y. Times (Dec. 6, 2011) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/sports/hockey/derek-boogaard-a-brain-goingbad.html?pagewanted=5&emc=etal); see also John Branch, Boy On Ice – The Life and Death of Derek Boogaard,
57-64 (2014) (Over six months, John Branch authored a novel and three-part series that examined the life and death
of former NHL enforcer Derek Boogaard. Branch notes, “those who believe Boogaard loved to fight have it wrong.
He loved what it brought: a continuation of an unlikely hockey career. And he loved what it meant: vengeance
against a lifetime of perceived doubters and the gratitude of teammates glad that he would do a job they could not
imagine”) [hereinafter “Branch’].
27
See Complaint at Law, Nelson v. Nat’l Hockey League, 20 F.Supp. 3d 650 (N.D. Ill. 2014), 2016 LEXIS 21028
(No. 13 C 4846) (Complaint filed by Derek Boogaard’s family against the NHL) [hereinafter “Nelson v. NHL”].
28
See Opinion of the Court, In Re: National football League Players Concussion Injury Litigation, (No. 15-2206)
(3rd Cir. 2016) available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2804909/N-F-L-Settlement-Court-ofAppeals-Opinion.pdf ( On April 18, 2016 the United States Court of appeals for the Third Circuit approved a $1
billion settlement to compensate current and former National Football League Players who have been diagnosed
with concussion-related injuries).

7

enforcers such as, Bob Probert, Steve Montador, and Wade Belak, many commentators accused
the NHL of fostering a culture of excessive violence.29 But perhaps the most infamous of the
recent tragedies was that of former NHL enforcer, Derek Boogaard.30 At 270-pounds and nearly
seven feet tall on skates, Boogaard understood from a young age, that his unusually large stature
would hinder his dreams of becoming a glorified goal-scorer in the NHL.31 Yet unlike countless
others who unsuccessfully came before him, Boogaard learned to utilize his size and toughness,
and was able to fist his way through the ranks of junior hockey and ultimately the NHL.32
Throughout his six-year tenure as an NHL enforcer, Boogaard dressed for a total of 277
games, scored only three goals, served 589 penalty minutes, and fought a record sixty-six times.33
Nicknamed “the Boogeyman,” Boogaard was feared by opponent and respected by his teammates,
thanks to his unmatched size and ability to overpower opponents. 34 But masked behind his
intimidating grin and inspirational toughness were swollen knuckles, broken bones, countless
concussions, and a secret addiction to alcohol and oxycodone.35 At the age of 28 and in the prime
of his career, Boogaard lost his final fight to addiction.36 Subsequently, Boogaard’s estate filed a
wrongful-death lawsuit against the National Hockey League, which alleged the NHL failed to
adequately protect and treat Boogaard for his injuries and addiction.37

See, Melanie Romero, Check to the Head: The Tragic Death of NHL Enforcer Derek Boogaard and the NHL’s
Negligence – How Enforcers Are Treated as Second-class Employees, 22 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sport. L. J. 271-275
(2015) (Current NHL Commissioner, Gary Bettman, is the only commissioner in major American professional
sports to admit that fighting is a part of the game).
30
Id. at 272.
31
See Branch, supra note 26.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See Nelson v. NHL, supra note 27.
29
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Unfortunately, Boogaard’s initial claims were deemed preempted under the federal Labor
Management Relations Act, which requires all arbitration measures prescribed within the National
Hockey League’s Collective Bargaining Act to be exhausted before commencement of a civil
suit.38

Notwithstanding this unfavorable ruling Boogaard’s estate filed a second amended

complaint in September of 2016.39 Consequently, the Boogaard lawsuit generated widespread
attention regarding the League’s excessively violent culture and further illuminated the issue of
whether fighting should remain a part of the game.40 Above all, the Boogaard complaints played
an arguably critical role in the recent class action filing by the National Hockey League Players’
Association against the National Hockey League.41
Separate from the Boogaard lawsuit, the National Hockey League Players’ Association
(“NHLPA” or “Players”) similarly allege that the National Hockey League “has promoted
unnecessary brutality and violence to become a dominant element of the game as played in the
league.”42 Generally, the Players class contends that the League,
[r]ather than exercise reasonable care in fulfilling its voluntarily assumed duty of
care to its players, pursued a long-running course of fraudulent and negligent
conduct to maintain and improve its economic advantage, which included failing
to make any statements of substance about concussions, MTBI, and other brain
injuries.43

See Nelson v. NHL, supra note 27 at 1-5 (denying the Boogaard estate’s motion to remand to state court because
§301 of the Labor Management Relations Act permits federal courts to entertain contract disputes between an
employer and a labor organization that are governed by a collective bargaining agreement); see e.g., 29 U.S.C.A.
§185(a).
39
See Second Amended Complaint at Law, Boogaard v. National Hockey League, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134232
(N.D. Ill. 2016) (No. 13 C 4846) available at https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/0846000/846404/170-main[1].pdf
(U.S. District Court Judge, Gary Feinerman, held that claims I through IV, which allege the League harmed
Boogaard by promoting violence in the NHL and remaining silent on the dangers associated with head trauma were
triable claims and not otherwise preempted under the Labor Management Relations Act).
40
See Romero, supra note 29.
41
See NHL Concussion Litigation, supra note 1.
42
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In Re: National Hockey League Players’
Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 14-2551 at 67 (SRN/JSM) (D. Minn. 2016).
43
Id. at 89.
38

9

Although the Players concede that there is an inescapable level of violence that exists within
professional ice hockey, when compared to other professional sports leagues such as the National
Football League and even the National Basketball Association, it is apparent that the “violent
dynamic of the NHL is wholly unique to the NHL.”44 For example, in both the National Football
League and National Basketball Association, any player who fights, punches or attempts to punch
another player, is to be immediately ejected from play and is often times subject to potential fines
and suspensions.45 More specifically, in both the International Ice Hockey Federation and the
National Collegiate Athletic Association, fighting is strictly prohibited.46

Therefore, if

professional ice hockey is so obviously violent, why doesn’t the National Hockey League
proscribe fighting altogether or enact specific measures that deter players from acting in an
unnecessarily violent and hyper-aggressive manner?
The answer—as alleged in the NHLPA’s complaint —is that the NHL has “expressly and
regularly acknowledged that it has capitalized on extreme violence, including fighting.”47 For
example, in 1989, then NHL President, John Ziegler stated, “fighting is an acceptable outlet for
the emotions that build up during play [and] until otherwise, it’s here to stay.” 48 Moreover, in
2011, current NHL Commissioner, Gary Bettman noted that “fan support was a specific reason
why fighting and other extreme violence persists in the NHL.”49 If you have ever glanced at the

44

Id. at 73.
Id.
46
Id. at 74.
47
Id. at 76.
48
Id. at 78; see also Mary Clarke and Pat Iversen, The Most Interesting and Damning Details From the Unsealed
Documents in the NHL Concussion Lawsuit, SB Nation (2016) available at:
http://www.sbnation.com/nhl/2016/3/30/11333286/nhl-concussion-lawsuit-unsealed-emails-gary-bettman-colincampbell (the NHL released 297 documents as part of discovery in the concussion lawsuit. Included within were
numerous emails from current NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman, as well as former League commissioners,
presidents, responded to team owners’ concerns regarding player safety by labeling their players as “soft,” or
“Greenpeace pukes […] that were responsible for their own injuries”).
49
See NHL Concussion Litigation, supra note 1 at 78-79.
45
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National Hockey League website, have seen one of its advertisements, or even played its officially
licensed video game, violent hits and fights are prominently displayed and serve as a marketing
tool for the League.
However, in addition to generating revenue, Bettman’s rationale for violence and fighting
is similar to those who believe it is a necessary mechanism for preventing and deterring further
violence within the game.50 Accordingly, Bettman even suggested that enforcers were comparable
to a “hockey thermostat, that helps cool things down when tension run high.”51 Nevertheless, the
League contends it took adequate steps to protect its players. For example, in 1979, the NHL
instituted a mandatory helmet rule, in which all players were required to wear a league-issued
helmet and refrain from deliberately removing it prior to an altercation.52 In 1997, the NHL created
a Concussion Program, in which team physicians were required to document, study and maintain
records of all players that reportedly suffered in-game concussions.53
Conversely, the NHLPA alleges the League’s preventative measures were simply a ploy to
make it seem as if they had a genuine interest in its players’ health and safety. Accordingly, the
results from the NHL Concussion Program, which took place over the course of seven regular
seasons, from 1997 to 2004, were not disclosed to players until 2011.54 After withholding the
findings for nearly seven years, the NHL finally disclosed the report. Included within, team
physicians recorded 559 concussions during the course of regular season play.55 Most alarmingly,

50

Id. at 79-82; See Yates, supra note 19.
Id.
52
Id. at 3.
53
Id. at 3-6.
54
Id. at 24-29; see e.g., Brian W. Benson M.D. Ph.D., et al., A Prospective Study of Concussions Among National
Hockey League Players During Regular Season Games: The NHL-NHLPA Concussion Program, 905-911, CMAJ
(2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3091898/pdf/1830905.pdf.
55
Id.
51
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twenty percent or nearly 112 of those 559 players returned to play in the same game in which they
suffered the concussion.56 Moreover, the NHLPA contends that, “despite these findings, the report
quickly sought to downplay their significance, concluding with the assurance that, essentially, no
cause and effect relationship could be found between concussions and other head hits and the
problems the Plaintiffs now experience.”57
Notwithstanding the Players’ claims in light of their contentions that the NHL promoted a
culture of excessive violence as a means to generate revenue, and failed to adequately warn and
protect players from the neurological risks of head injuries suffered while playing in the NHL; the
League has openly iterated their desire to pursue litigation and forgo any settlement discussions.58
But perhaps the League should be more concerned with this ongoing suit. Unlike the initial claims
brought by the Boogaard estate, in which a majority of the claims were preempted under federal
law, the League’s previous motion to dismiss on the grounds of federal labor law preemption were
swiftly set aside.59
Before analyzing the potential likelihood of success of the NHLPA’s tort-specific
negligence claims, Part II of this article outlines the existing landscape of American tort law as
related to personal injuries suffered as a result of athletic participation. Accordingly, this overview

56

Id.
Id.
58
See Greg Wyshynski, NHL Has ‘No desire’ to Settle Concussion Lawsuit, Says Internal Memo, Yahoo Sports,
(2015) available at http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nhl-puck-daddy/nhl-has--no-desire--to-settle-concussion-lawsuit-says-internal-memo-165002717.html.
59
See Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re: National Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation,
MDL 14-2551, 18-41 (SRN/JSM) (D. Minn.) (2016) (on May 16, 2016, United States District Court Judge, Susan
Richard Nelson, issued a memorandum opinion and order denying the NHL’s motion to dismiss the NHLPA’s
negligence claims on the grounds of federal labor law preemption).
57
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will provide a more educated prediction of whether the NHLPA will likely succeed in its class
action suit against the NHL.
II. Conduct Giving Rise to Tort Liability in the Arena of Sports:
As the use of excessive force in the form of competitive violence has escalated within the
arenas of professional and amateur sports, so too has the number of injured athletes who seek
redress through civil courts.60 However, many courts prefer to refrain from and often attempt to
limit their involvement to the most egregious cases in an effort to avoid having to grapple with
unsettled and non-uniform state tort law.61 Articulating basic tort law concepts such as intent,
consent, assumption of the risk and the scope of liability can pose a significant challenge in cases
involving violent sports like professional ice hockey. Especially considering most of the conduct
that takes place on the ice could generally be subject to criminal or civil liability if taken place off
the ice.62 Nonetheless, as excessive violence has become an increasingly common aspect of
competitive sports, more and more claimants have opted to come to the courts for formal relief.
In the United States, the prevailing standard for recovery in sports-related tort claims is
generally limited to injuries that occur as a result of intentional or reckless conduct.63 Although
claims based on the theory of negligence are commonly dismissed as an inappropriate basis for
recovery, a small minority of courts have been willing to entertain such claims if they implicate

60

Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Craig Dernis, Revisiting Excessive Violence in the Professional Sports Arena:
Changes in the past Twenty Years? (1996) 6 Seton Hall J. Sports L. 127
61
See Daniel S. Greene, From the Ice to the Courtroom: Analyzing the Relationship Between Professional Ice
Hockey and Tort Liability, 23 Sport Law. J. 57, at 69 (2016) [hereinafter “Greene”].
62
See Greene, supra note 61 at 66; see e.g., Jeffrey A. Citron and Mark Ableman, Civil Liability in the Arena of
Professional Sports, 36 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 193, at 197 (2003) [hereinafter “Citron”]; Nicola Joyce, Too Many
Men on the Ice?: Why Criminal Prosecutors Should Refrain From Policing On-Ice Violence in the NHL, Harvard
John M. Olin Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, No. 9 (2009).
63
See Citron, supra note 62 at 197.
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organizational negligence or involve injuries suffered as a result of participation in a recreational
sports league.64 Additionally, many of these sports injury claims never reach fruition in part
because of the maxim of volenti non fit injuria (no wrong is done to one who is willing to be
injured).65 Consequently, this maxim, otherwise known as the doctrine of voluntary assumption
of the risk, is often the hardest hurdle for claimants to overcome.66
A. Intentional Tort Theory – Assault and Battery
In the United States, claimants seeking redress for injuries that occur as a result of player
to player conduct are generally required to assert something more than mere negligence.67
Specifically, claimants generally must advance their claims on a theory of recklessness or assault
and battery, i.e., intentional torts.68 Perhaps the most obvious theory giving rise to participant-toparticipant liability are claims based on the theory of intentional torts. Under this theory, claimants
generally allege that the defendant’s conduct constituted and an assault and or battery. 69 In short,
a defendant can be held liable for a battery if he intentionally causes an unprivileged, harmful
contact with the claimant, and such contact actually occurred.70 Even if the harmful or offensive
contact with the claimant did not occur, a defendant may be liable for an assault if the claimant

64

See e.g., Cameron J. Raines, Sports Violence: A Matter of Societal Concern, 55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 796 (1980);
Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 96-97 (Mass. 1989) (during a college hockey game, defendant speared the plaintiff
in his midsection, causing serious injury to plaintiff. Although defendant’s actions were prohibited in all levels of
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can prove the defendant’s intentional conduct placed him in “imminent apprehension” of his life
or safety.71
In Averill v. Lutrell,72 plaintiff was a semi-professional baseball player.73 While at bat, the
opposing pitcher gestured a threatening motion, suggesting his intent to “stick the next pitch in
[plaintiff’s] ear.”74 After plaintiff successfully avoided being hit by three close pitches, the fourth
brushed his arm.75 As plaintiff proceeded to take his base, he aggressively tossed his bat in the
direction of the pitcher.76 Without any warning, the defendant catcher, stood up a struck plaintiff
in the back of his head with his fist.77 Consequently, plaintiff was knocked unconscious and
fractured his jaw upon falling face-first to the ground.78 The plaintiff sued the defendant for assault
and battery and was awarded $5,000.79 Although the court in Averill focused heavily on the issue
of respondeat superior, the court characterized the defendant’s actions as an impermissible,
“willful [and] independent assault” on an unsuspecting player that fell entirely outside the scope
of the game.80
However, when considering the violent nature of contact sports such as ice hockey, which
permits fighting and hyper-aggressive conduct, many claims advanced under this theory are not as
successful as one might initially think. For example, in McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club,81 the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri held that a severe body check was
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not actionable as a matter of law because the hit at issue was an inescapable “a part of the game”
of ice hockey.82 In McKichan, the plaintiff was a goaltender for a minor league hockey team that
was affiliated with the NHL.83 Prior to the incident at issue, plaintiff skated out of his crease
towards the near-side boards after the puck was sent over the glass and out of play.84 Even though
the referee blew his whistle, signaling a stoppage in play, the defendant proceeded to skate in the
direction of plaintiff at full speed.85 The referee took notice of the defendant’s actions and blew
his whistle a second time.86 To no avail, the defendant ignored the whistle and ultimately delivered
a gruesome body check on the unsuspecting plaintiff.87 The blow knocked the plaintiff into the
boards and rendered him unconscious for nearly 30 minutes.88
Accordingly, plaintiff sued both the defendant and the St. Louis Blues organization, and
was awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages.

89

However, the Missouri Court of Appeals

reversed, and ruled in favor of the defendants.90 Although the court did not explicitly prescribe an
applicable standard of care, the court listed numerous factors that assisted their decision. Such
factors included:
the ages and physical attributes of the participants, their respective skills
and knowledge of the rules and customs, their status as amateurs or
professionals, the type of risks which inhere to the game and those which
are outside the realm of reasonable anticipation, the presence or absence of
protective equipment, [and] the degree of zest with which the game is being
played.91
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The court concluded that although the defendant’s conduct was extremely aggressive and
constituted an intentional violation of the rules of the game, his actions were not outside the realm
of reasonable anticipation considering the extremely violent nature of professional ice hockey.92
Moreover, the court added, “for better or for worse, [violence and rough play] are part of the game
of professional ice hockey.”93
As exemplified by the Averill and, to a lesser extent, McKichan, decisions, intentional tort
theories are considered a viable cause of action in the sports participant liability context. However,
most claims brought under this theory are generally successful only “when players step outside
their roles as fellow competitors,” and go beyond what is ordinarily permissible by willfully or
maliciously attacking one another.94 In the context of non-contact sports such as baseball,
determining whether a participant acted with the requisite intent and malice seems rather
straightforward considering violent conduct like that of the defendant in Averill, is generally
deemed outside the scope of the game. But in the context of contact sports such as ice hockey, the
McKichan decision illustrates the courts’ laissez faire approach, which recognizes a cause of action
only when “no player could reasonably anticipate the act.”95 Not only does this approach allow
the courts to balance the basic tort law principle of volenti non fit injuria with the underlying
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circumstances, but, as a practical matter, this heightened threshold is indicative of the courts’
preference to avoid unnecessary judicial oversight of professional competitive sports.96
B. Recklessness Theory
The majority of state courts in the United States generally only require sports participants
to show that the defendant’s conduct was reckless. As defined within the Restatement (Second)
of Torts,
[an] actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he
does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other
to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a
reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable
risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.97
In short, recklessness falls somewhere in between the negligence theory and intentional tort theory.
Accordingly, the recklessness threshold is higher than mere negligence because it requires a
showing that the defendant knew or should have reasonably known that his actions, or lack thereof,
created a substantially unreasonable risk of harm.98 Moreover, the recklessness threshold requires
less than intentional torts because the claimant need only prove that the defendant acted
intentionally or with conscious disregard.99 Comparatively, under the intentional tort theory, the
claimant must show the defendant acted with the specific intent to cause a harmful result, beyond
mere conscious disregard for the safety of another.100 Despite this lesser threshold, the doctrine of
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assumption of risk remains an elusive concept in some jurisdictions as it would for claims brought
under the intentional tort theory.101
In Nabozny v. Barnhill,102 the plaintiff, a high school soccer-goalkeeper, was severely
injured during a match when the defendant, an opposing forward, kicked the plaintiff in the head.103
During the course of regular play, the plaintiff positioned himself at the top of the penalty box and
went down on his knee in an effort to retrieve and secure a rolling pass directed towards him.104
As the plaintiff cradled the ball to his chest, the pursuing defendant continued onward in the
direction of the plaintiff and proceeded to kick the plaintiff in the left side of his head.105 The
plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant and the
trial court ruled in favor of the defendant.106
On appeal, however, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court ruling and ordered
a new trial.107 The Nabozny court acknowledged that “the law should not place unreasonable
burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports,” but further expressed, “some of the
restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete on to the playing field.”108 The court held
that in competitive sports in which the players are trained and thus, deemed knowledgeable of a
set of rules primarily designed to protect players’ safety, owe a “duty to fellow competitors to
refrain from conduct proscribed by such rules.”109 Accordingly, a player is potentially “liable for

101

Restatement (Second) of Torts cmt. b (1965).
334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
103
Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 260.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 261.
108
Id. at 260-61.
109
Id.
102

19

injury in a tort action if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate, willful or with a reckless
disregard for the safety of the other player so as to cause injury to that player.”110
Although the Nabozny court did not explicitly specify what constitutes reckless disregard,
many jurisdictions subsequently adopted the Nabozny logic, requiring claimants to prove that the
defendant acted either 1) willfully with the intent to injure; or 2) where intent cannot be proven,
with an utter indifference or conscious disregard for the safety of others.111 In Hackbart v.
Cincinnati Bengals,112 the plaintiff, a safety for the Denver Broncos, suffered a broken neck as a
result of an altercation with the defendant, a running back for the Cincinnati Bengals.113 The
incident at issue occurred when the plaintiff fell to the ground after attempting to block the
defendant.114 As the play progressed up-field the defendant, “acting out of anger and frustration,
but without specific intent to injure,” lunged forward and struck the kneeling plaintiff in the back
of the head.115 The sheer force of defendant’s blow was so powerful that both players fell to the
ground.116 However, because the referees did not observe the incident no subsequent penalty was
assessed.117 Moreover, the plaintiff did not come to realize the severity of his injuries until the
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next day, when he began experiencing neck pain.118 Nonetheless, plaintiff’s career was abruptly
ended as he was released from the team.
Consequently, the plaintiff sued the defendant individually for reckless misconduct, as well
as the defendant’s employing team for negligently failing to control their player. 119 The U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recovery,
placing a great deal of emphasis on the inherently violent nature of professional football in relation
with the doctrine of assumption of risk.120 The court compared the morality of the playing to that
of a battlefield, and explained because the game is played “with a reckless-abandonment of selfprotective instincts,” the plaintiff “must have recognized and accepted the risk that he would be
injured by such an act.”121
On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court ruling and stated, it is a
fundamental policy of tort law that “for every injury wrongfully inflicted, some redress under the
state law must be afforded since it is essential that citizens be able to look to their government for
redress.”122 Unsatisfied with the district court’s reliance on the doctrine of assumption of risk, the
Tenth Circuit further explained, “there are no principles of law which allow a court to rule out
certain tortious conduct by reason of general roughness of the game or difficulty of administering
it.”123 Similar to the appellate court in Nabozny, the Tenth Circuit highlighted the distinction
between negligent misconduct and intentional and reckless conduct.124 The court concluded that
even though the defendant lacked specific intent to injure required for an intentional tort claim, his
118
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actions were more than a mere inadvertence.125 As in Nabozny, the Tenth Circuit went on to find
that the defendant’s actions constituted reckless misconduct because he consciously disregarded
specific rules of the game that were primarily designed to protect player-safety.126
The Tenth Circuit’s holding in Hackbart “transmitted a sobering message to the sports
establishment—if they cannot keep their own house clean, the courts will not hesitate to do it for
them.”127

Accordingly, the Hackbart holding strengthened the principles established under

Nabozny and reiterated the notion that sports participants, regardless of their amateur or
professional status, will not be shielded from liability simply because they did not intend to cause
harm. Moreover, the Hackbart decision essentially rendered limitations imposed under the
doctrine of assumption inapplicable to claims based on reckless misconduct. The Tenth Circuit
concluded that mere participation in such violent sports does not manifest consent to such reckless
or proscribed conduct of other participants. Following Nabozny and Hackbart, a sports participant
may be liable for an injury cased to a fellow competitor if 1) he acted with specific intent to bring
about a specific harm; or 2) he intended the act committed, but lacked sufficient knowledge or
consciously disregarded the reasonable likelihood significant harm would result.
C. Negligence Theory and the Application of Assumption of Risk.
Generally, most courts that have been willing to entertain sports participant liability claims
have demonstrated a reluctance to recognize actions for simple negligence, and instead require
claimants to bring such claims under either an intentional tort theory or recklessness theory.128 As
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defined within the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a person may be liable for negligently causing
physical harm to another if the actor 1) has a duty to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances; 2) it is reasonably foreseeable that his conduct will cause, or is likely to cause
physical harm; and 3) the actor’s unreasonable conduct is the factual cause of the claimants
harm.129 Consequently, the majorities’ reluctance is in recognition of the fact that subjecting
another participant to an unreasonable risk of harm—the essence of a negligence claim— is a
fundamental element of contact sports such as football and hockey.130 Thus, the majorities’
rationale is essentially predicated on the doctrine of assumption of risk.
In McKichan, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence claim against the defendant’s
employing organization, and ruled the doctrine of assumption of risk precluded liability for injuries
that arise from risks inherent to the sport of ice hockey.131 Even though the defendant’s illegal
check arguably constituted recklessness under the Nabozny and Hackbart frameworks, the court
opined that doctrine precluded plaintiff’s negligence claims because physical conduct and
aggressive body-checks are a fundamental part of the game of ice hockey.132 Notwithstanding the
majorities’ unwillingness to recognize sports torts negligence claims, there are a minority of
jurisdictions that have permitted such claims to proceed. However, it is important to note that
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most of these cases involve participation in nonprofessional sports and thus, are not relevant to the
analysis of this note.133
Although courts have not generally spelled it out, there is an apparent, logical relationship
between the foreseeability of violence, particularly violence that is not part of the game, itself, and
the doctrine of assumption of risk. In non-contact sports, such as baseball and soccer, the
correlation between foreseeability of harmful conduct and assumption of the risk is somewhat
clearer than in comparison to contact sports. For example, in the Averill and Nabozny decisions,
the court’s decision can be explained by the nature of the sport: violent or hyper-aggressive
conduct is substantially less likely to occur because violent conduct is not a natural or expected
aspect of the game of baseball and soccer, respectively. Both the batter in Averill and the
goaltender in Nabozny could not have reasonably assumed the risks associated with the defendants’
conduct because the expectation for such violent and injurious conduct was highly unforeseeable,
given the non-violent nature of the sports at hand. Consequently, a participant’s presumed
assumption of the risks associated with the sport generally decreases as the likelihood or
foreseeability of violent conduct decreases. To the contrary, in contact sports such as hockey and
football, a participant is presumed to have assumed a greater amount of risks because violent
conduct is more foreseeable when considering the violent nature of the game.
Through that lens, the McKichan decision makes some sense. There, the court adopted a
circumstantial approach and emphasized certain conduct, such as a severe and illegal body check
on an unsuspecting player, was considered an inescapable aspect of the game of ice hockey.
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Although the defendant’s conduct might have been proscribed under the rules of the game, the
McKichan court ruled that such illegal body checks were not outside the reasonable realm of
anticipation.
However, it becomes evident that the correlation between dangerousness and assumption
of the risk is problematic when it comes to violent conduct that is not generally expected or
accepted as a part of the game. In both the McKichan and Hackbart decisions, the court grappled
with the issue of whether or not the injured claimants had assumed the risks associated with such
violent and aggressive sports. In Hackbart, the court emphasized the fundamental policy rationale
of tort law and stressed the need for appropriate redress regardless of the violent nature of the
sport. On the one hand, it is not obviously unreasonable to conclude that since a player has
assumed the risk to get hit in a dangerous manner by another player in the course of the game
within the rules has also, thereby, assumed the risk of being hit by another player in a dangerous
manner in the course of the game in violation of the rules. On the other hand, there can be no
doubt that a player is also much more likely to guard themselves against injuries that come from
rule-compliant conduct than against injuries that come from rule-violating conduct.
The reasoning in McKichan and other like-minded cases leaves claimants in hockey with
only one option: those torts that do not allow for assumption of risk—namely, intentional torts
and, to a lesser extent, recklessness.134 Courts generally do not accept that intentional, injurious
conduct is something that is part of the general risks of an activity that can be assumed by a
participant. In sports, participants might consent to such conduct, but a participant might assume

134

Compare Restatement (second) of Torts § 496A (limiting assumption of the risk to negligent and reckless
conduct and City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.4th 747, 751 (2007) “an agreement made in the context
of sports or recreational programs or services, purporting to release liability for future gross negligence, generally is
unenforceable as a matter of public policy.”).

25

the risk of being carelessly body checked but not the risk of being mugged or sucker-punched from
behind. To be sure, a participant might consent to conduct within the bounds of the sport’s rules
(or just beyond them), but it is not a question of assumption of the risk. This means that when a
player complains of an intentional tort, the primary hurdle that they must clear is consent. When
viewed through that lens, it is unreasonable to conclude that a player has consented to violent
actions against them that go well beyond the rules of the game.
III. The Dennis Wideman Incident & NHL Concussion Litigation
A. The Wideman Incident
On January 27, 2016, former NHL Linesman, Don Henderson, was forcefully struck in the
back of his neck/head by Calgary Flames defenseman, Dennis Wideman.135 The incident occurred
as Wideman, who had appeared to have been disoriented from a previous hit, skated towards to
bench area in attempt to exit the ice.136 Within feet of the bench and “without provocation,
Wideman grasped his stick with both hands and forcefully struck Henderson from behind with the
shaft of his stick.”137 As a result of the hit, Henderson suffered significant injuries and was forced
to retire from his position as an NHL linesman.138 Wideman was subsequently suspended and
fined by the NHL.139 Accordingly, the ongoing suit between the NHL and the Players’ Association
pertains primarily to the legality of Wideman’s suspension. However, for purposes of this article,
these facts provide a hypothetical landscape perfect for illustrating the potential application of law
if Henderson were to file a civil suit against Wideman.
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Based on the legal frameworks set forth above, Henderson would have to bring a claim
against Wideman and allege Wideman acted either intentionally or with recklessness. Under the
intentional tort theory, Henderson would need to prove that Wideman had intent to make an
objectively harmful or offensive contact.140 Under the Averill holding, Henderson would need to
show that Wideman’s conduct constituted an impermissible, “willful [and] independent assault”
on an unsuspecting player that fell entirely outside the scope of the game.141 Moreover, under the
McKichan holding, Henderson would need to show that Wideman’s actions constituted an
intentional violation of the rules of the game and were outside the realm of reasonable
anticipation142
For arguments sake, if Henderson could not prove Wideman had the requisite intent to
injure, he could potentially assert a cause of action under the recklessness theory as iterated in
Nabozny143 and Hackbart.144 Henderson would need to prove 1) Wideman intended to commit his
actions; and 2) his conduct constituted a conscious disregard of the reasonable likelihood
significant harm would result.145 Accordingly, under both Nabozny and Hackbart, such reckless
misconduct can be established by a showing that a participant acted with a conscious disregard of
specific rules primarily designed to protect player-safety.146
Accordingly, Henderson may have difficulty proving Wideman acted with specific intent
to injure because Wideman claims to have been concussed just prior to the incident.147
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Notwithstanding any difficulties relating to this intent threshold, Henderson may have a stronger
claim under the recklessness theory because Wideman’s conduct could be considered a conscious
disregard for Henderson’s safety. Unlike the aforementioned cases, this situation is particularly
unique because it involves a referee and not a co-participant. Thus, one might contend that any
implications relating to the assumption of risk are explicitly irrelevant because unlike players,
referees are not similarly situated to the extent they do not have a reasonable expectation of being
deliberately body-checked or mugged from behind by a player.
For example, a referee may be deemed to have assumed the risk of injury if while
attempting to break up a fight, he was punch accidentally by a player. But under these facts, it is
highly unlikely that a fact finder could conclude that a referee assumed the risk of injury because
the rules of the game explicitly prohibit players from recklessly and intentionally applying physical
force directed towards a referee.148 Moreover, Wideman’s conduct was completely unexpected
and unforeseeable because his actions were not considered a part of the game. These facts provide
a great illustration of how the foreseeability of violence and the assumption of risk relate to one
another.
Although Henderson may have consented and even assumed some of the risks associated
with being on the ice, as a referee, Henderson is comparable to an innocent bystander, and thus,
could not have reasonably assumed the risk of being mugged from behind by Wideman. If
Henderson were an opposing player, perhaps the court, like in McKichan, would conclude that
Henderson assumed such risks given the uniquely violent nature of ice hockey. However, because
Wideman’s actions were in direct violation of the NHL rules, and arguably an intentional form of
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retaliation against Henderson for a previously missed call, one might argue that Henderson is in a
favorable position to assert a meritorious claim against Wideman.
B. The NHL Concussion Litigation
As previously mentioned, the National Hockey League Players’ Association and the
National Hockey League are in the midst of a class action lawsuit, in which the Players allege the
League acted recklessly and negligently by failing to warn and adequately protect players from the
adverse effects of repeated concussions and head trauma; and instead promoted a culture of
unreasonable and unnecessary violence.149 Specifically, the Players allege that the League fostered
a culture of excessive violence as a means of generating revenue and developing a greater fan
base.150 Moreover, the Players contend that the League acted recklessly because the NHL knew
or reasonably should have known, as a result of the 2011 Concussion Program data, “that repeated
concussive impacts that the Players endured while playing in the NHL likely put them at
substantially-increased risks of developing one or more neurodegenerative diseases or conditions,
including, but not limited to, dementia, ALS, CTE, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, and
any cognitive, or behavioral conditions associated with such.”151
Even though many commentators have suggested the Players have presented weak claims
against the League,152 it will be interesting to witness how the suit plays out in the coming months.
Some commentators have even gone so far as to suggest that the recent $1 billion settlement in the
National Football League will incentivize the NHL to settle the suit and extinguish such negative
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attention.153 However, considering the lack of scientific evidence connecting repetitive blows to
the head and long term health risks, it is very possible that the NHL refuses to settle and instead
fights the Players in court.
i. Significant Challenges Affecting the Players’ Claims
Admittedly, the Players are at a distinct disadvantage because the majority of courts in the
United States refuse to permit such sport torts claims on the basis of negligence. Notwithstanding
this general reluctance, the Players’ claims are only the second of its kind, behind the National
Football League’s. Considering that case settled out of court prior to trial, it remains unclear
whether a federal judge will permit an organizational negligence cause of action. On the other
hand, because the Players also alleged that the League acted recklessly, under the Nabozny and
Hackbart frameworks, one might argue their claims are not as weak as they may seem.
As a threshold matter, the Players must establish that the League has a duty to care for its
players. The League controls the rules of the game, the equipment the players wear, and even the
medical protocol and monitoring players must complete before returning to play. Accordingly,
this is substantive proof that the League has taken it upon themselves to protect the players from
foreseeable harms associated with playing professional ice hockey and assumed the duty to take
reasonable efforts to that end. When determining whether the League breached this duty, the
Players have an arguably sturdy claim considering the League, as evidenced by current and former
commissioners’ statements,154 used violence as a means of generating profits. Yet despite the
barbaric and extremely unsafe nature of fighting and violence in hockey, this contention only
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supports the notion that the League breached its duty towards the Players and does not establish
the requisite element of causation.
a. Causation and the Assumption of Risk
Assuming this suit does in fact go all the way to trial and does not settle out of court, the
Players could face a significant hurdle with respect to proving causation because most, if not all
of the players included in the class, may have great difficulty proving the Leagues’ actions, or lack
thereof, were the proximate cause of their injuries. Most notably, the Players will likely face great
difficulty establishing causation given the lack of scientific data connecting repetitive blows to the
head and long-term health risks. Moreover, the relationship between the foreseeability of violence
and whether the Players assumed the risks associated with such a uniquely violent sport will play
a critical role in determining whether the Players have a viable theory of causation.
As previously mentioned, the McKichan court determined that the plaintiff in that case
assumed the risk of being illegally and forcefully body checked because such violence was a part
of the inescapable aspects of the game. Like in McKichan, the Players will likely have great
difficulty contending they did not assume the risks associated with the violent nature of hockey
because aggressive stick slashes and fighting are also considered inescapable elements of the
game. But the players are not required to fight or play with a reckless abandonment in order to
win. Instead, the winner is determined by the team who scores the most goals. Although fighting
may have an indirect impact on the outcome of a game, i.e., a favorable shift in momentum, it by
no means dictates which team will win.
As in McKichan, the court may give a great amount of deference to the circumstances
surrounding the Players claims. Specifically, these players are highly-skilled, trained, professional
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athletes and are deemed to have a reasonable understanding and expectation of the foreseeable
risks associated with the violent nature of ice hockey.155
Given the unique nature of professional ice hockey and the propensity for violence, the
court may reasonably conclude that the Players assumed the risks of potential injury and therefore
lack the requisite causation to establish a meritorious claim. For example, Derek Boogaard fought
over sixty times throughout his career in the NHL. However, considering he fought hundreds, if
not thousands of times throughout his entire hockey career, the requisite connection for causation
seems blurred. Like Derek Boogaard, the Players would have to establish a nexus between the
Leagues’ duty to protect their health and safety, and their asserted injuries. This will likely cause
a significant challenge for the Players especially when considering some of the players included
in the class have been playing hockey since they were young boys. Moreover, a vast majority of
the players also played long careers in the minors and at the collegiate level. Consequently, the
League might contend that because these players spent a majority of time playing in a league other
than the NHL, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that their injuries were not foreseeable and
that the League was responsible for their alleged injuries.
Yet, the Players may have a strong counter argument if confronted with allegations that
contend they assumed the risk of injury by participating in such a uniquely violent sport. As in
Nabozny and Hackbart, where participants assumed the risk of injury inherent to the nature of the
game, here, the players could argue that, while they might have consented to the inherent risks
associated with the sport, they did not consent or assume the risks of the long-term health
complications as set forth in the complaint. For example, such inherent risks may include injuries
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such as lacerations, dislodged teeth and broken bones from fighting and ordinary rough or violent
play.
b. Class Certification
Like sport tort cases brought by individual claimants, the Players’ class action has many
parallels, but also unique challenges that individual plaintiffs otherwise do not face. For example,
unlike individual claimants, the Players must establish that the class of representative is
appropriate and that the class of claimants share a common injury. Additionally, individual
claimants generally have a greater control over litigation strategies, specifically, whether to accept
a proposed settlement offer. Conversely, the class of Players must come to a mutual agreement,
among other requirements, prior to accepting a proposed settlement offer.
The class of Players in this suit could contend—like in the Henderson—that they never
assumed the specific risks relating to concussions because they did not know, nor were they
reasonably capable of knowing, the alarmingly negative health risks associated with such a violent
sport, although the League was in the position to know those things and prevent them through the
threat of greater sanctions or taking other defensive measures. To further support this contention
the Players have asserted that their lack of knowledge and subsequent injury, regardless of their
assumption of the risk, was in part caused by the League, considering the League withheld
unfavorable medical data from their 2011 Concussion Program for nearly seven years.156 This
contention could play a critical role when establishing causation, especially considering that the
players are likely disadvantaged under the doctrine of assumption of risk.
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Additionally, this issue of causation also implicates challenges relating to whether or not
the Players will be granted certification as a proper class of plaintiffs. As of January 2017, the
League and Players are currently awaiting a ruling relating to the appropriateness of the class of
plaintiffs.157 However, the court may likely conclude that the class of plaintiffs is improper for
this litigation because they lack commonality. In order to gain certification as a proper class of
plaintiffs, the class must generally establish, among other minor elements, that the individual
plaintiffs seeking redress share a common injury that can be practically adjudicated by the
courts.158 Accordingly, the League may have a strong argument in support of denying class
certification to the Players because not all of the plaintiffs in the proposed class necessarily share
the same type or timing of injury.
For example, some of the listed plaintiffs played in the League nearly thirty years ago.
During that period, neither the League nor the players knew or should have had reason to know of
the potentially adverse health risks associated with playing professional hockey. Moreover, the
fact that these plaintiffs played at different times creates further challenges relating to the
application and limitations imposed by various collective bargaining agreements. For instance,
some of the younger claimants may not have a proper claim in court if the collective bargaining
agreement governing the Players at the times of their alleged injuries required arbitration relating
such claims. Whereas older players, who were presumably governed by a different collective
bargaining agreement might not have been limited in such a way. Although the court has
previously ruled that the current collective bargaining agreement does not impose any hurdles for
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the class of plaintiffs, it will be interesting to see if the League contends that previous agreements
should be applied to these claims.
IV. Conclusion
As previously mentioned, professional ice hockey is perhaps the most dangerous and
violent sport, considering the natural and inescapable elements of the game. In addition to the
weapon-like equipment and violent body checks that occur at remarkably high speeds, hockey is
the only modern day sport that openly tolerates its players to fight. Yet unlike sports in which
fighting has a direct impact on the winner of the game, hockey is unique because its inclusion of
fighting is like pouring gasoline on an already violent fire of a sport. Although some players and
fans alike contend that fighting and hyper-aggressive conduct is a necessary mechanism to keep
the game safe, this paradoxical rationale is obviously flawed given the recent class action
concussion lawsuit and alleged injuries.
Based on the general tort law principles relating to sport torts claims, it remains unclear
whether the League or the Players will come out on top of the ongoing litigation. Because hockey
is so uniquely violent, the court, unlike those that previously entertained sport tort cases, will very
likely face significant challenges relating to whether the Players assumed the foreseeable risks
associated with playing such a violent sport. Moreover, it will be interesting to see if the Players
will succeed on the merits as a class, or if certain claimants opt out to pursue individual claims
against the League or individual wrongdoers. As a class action, the plaintiffs are more likely to
experience more challenges as a result of the class certification requirements, the potential
application of previous collective bargaining agreements, and the difficulties associated with
causation and assumption of the risk.
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Notwithstanding the potential challenges associated with the ongoing suit, it is important
to emphasize that the court hearing the NHL Concussion lawsuit has the opportunity to step up
and hold professional sports organizations accountable for their failure to protect their players’
safety and wellbeing. It is somewhat bizarre to think that no modern-day court has explicitly ruled
such violent and grossly negligent conduct as inexcusable on the field of play because such
violence should be expected by participants. As a result of the courts unwillingness to provide a
clear set of directives relating to the potential application of law to sport tort cases, the courts have
created a great deal of tension between the fundamental policies of law and its potential application
to sports tort cases.
Specifically, the courts have focused far too much on the violent nature of the sport at hand
and the foreseeability of harm, rather than the wrongful conduct at issue. Consequently, this has
created an odd relationship: as the foreseeability of violence in sports increases, a participant’s
potential claim becomes less actionable. This creates a perverse incentive where leagues that
exploit the violent nature of a sport for profit receive greater tort protection through assumption of
the risk than those leagues that are generally less violent and exploitative. Regardless of the violent
nature of sports, the courts should not be given deference to determine whether an injured
participant has a viable claim based on the courts subjective perception of the foreseeability of
potentially violent conduct. The underlying policy rationale of tort law is to provide protection,
safety and appropriate redress for injured claimants. Allowing the courts to determine whether a
claimant assumed the risk of injury based on the courts understanding of the violent nature of a
specific sport completely undermines and frustrates this policy rationale.
Instead, the courts should direct return to the frameworks as iterated in Hackbart and
Nabozny, and direct their attention to the alleged wrongful conduct rather than the violent nature
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and circumstances of the sport involved. If the courts continue to turn a blind eye towards sport
tort cases, specifically organizational claims, players’ unions may be forced to strike until their
governing league succumbs to the players’ demands for greater protection.
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